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We provide theoretical and empirical evidence on the factors that influence the willingness of academic
scientists to share research results. We distinguish between two types of sharing, specific sharing in
which a researcher shares her data or materials with another and general sharing in which scientists
report results to the entire community (as in conference presentations). We present two simple games
in which scientists research a problem of scientific merit (with an associated prize of academic and/or
commercial value). In both cases, the scientists have intermediate research results but none has solved
the entire problem.We test these models using a unique survey of bio-scientists in the UK and Germany
regarding their willingness to "share." Our results generally support both models. In both, sharing
is negatively related to competition and the importance of patents. In other respects they differ markedly.
For example, large teams are more likely to share specifically but less likely to share generally. Rank
does not matter for general sharing, but it does for specific sharing, where untenured faculty are less
likely to share. One important implication is that policies designed to enhance sharing must be tailored
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Sharing of information is critical to scientiﬁc progress, so much so that the Mertonian norm
of unconditional sharing of knowledge is considered one of the deﬁning features of academic
life (Merton 1973). In principle, this norm is enforced by a priority-based scientiﬁcr e w a r d
system in which the ﬁrst person to discover a result gets whatever "prize" is associated with
discovery (Dasgupta and David 1987; Stephan 1996). There is, however, a tension between
communal sharing and the competitive incentives for scientists during the research process
itself (Dasgupta and David 1994; Murray and O’Mahoney 2007). This tension, as well as the
realization of commercial potential for much academic work over the past thirty years has
drawn considerable attention to information sharing among academic scientists (Blumenthal
et al. 1996; Causino et al.1996; Campbell et al. 2000; Cohen and Walsh 2008; Gans et al.
2008; Murray 2009).
In this paper, we examine what drives scientists to share information. We present two
simple games in which scientists decide whether or not to share unprotected research results
and derive testable hypotheses regarding their behavior. We then provide empirical tests
using a survey of university bio-scientists in the United Kingdom and Germany regarding
their willingness to share research results with other bio-scientists. One of the most striking
features of our analysis, both theoretically and empirically, is our ﬁnding that what drives
scientists to share and the extent to which they share depends on the context. To do
this, we distinguish two types of sharing: one-on-one situations in which one scientist is
asked by another to share speciﬁc data or materials and public sharing, such as conference
participation where researchers present work that is neither published nor patented at the
time of presentation. The former we call speciﬁc sharing and the latter, general sharing.
In both cases, we consider scientists competing for a prize awarded to the ﬁrst to solve
a research problem. In the speciﬁc sharing game, we focus on the decision of two scientists
as to whether to share materials (such as a cell line) or data with each other. This situation
has clear elements of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Dasgupta and David 1994). If a scientist shares
her materials, she increases the likelihood that the other scientist will solve the problem
before she does. On the other hand, it has the potential beneﬁt that the other scientist may
share his materials in the future. Both scientists would be better oﬀ if they shared, but
in equilibrium neither shares unless the game is repeated a suﬃcient number of times. We
specify a probabilistic horizon, which allows us to derive hypotheses regarding sharing at
various stages of scientists’ career cycles. The likelihood that sharing occurs in equilibrium
depends on the value of the prize, the value of their results to date, their ability to exploit
the information shared, and the probability of the game continuing. The model also predicts
1that, all else equal, scientists with similar probabilities of winning the prize are more likely
to share.
In the general sharing game, we focus on the conﬂicting incentives facing scientists when
they consider presenting research results with the entire community prior to publication. The
beneﬁt of presentation is credit for the part of the problem she has solved as well as potential
feedback, but there is an expected cost because members of the community may have solved
complementary parts of the problem so that presentation increases their likelihood of winning
the prize. As well scientists who present are not guaranteed that their contribution will be
acknowledged. In this game, whether or not sharing is an equilibrium outcome depends on
the scientists’ beliefs as to whether others will verify work that is not acknowledged. When
there are only two scientists in the community, veriﬁcation is not possible so that without
suﬃciently valuable feedback the scientist keeps her results to herself. However, with more
than two scientists, depending on the size of the prize, the extent to which the preliminary
results solve the problem and alter complementors’ chances of winning the prize, beliefs about
veriﬁcation and punishment for lack of acknowledgement, and feedback, the equilibrium can
involve conference presentation and acknowledgement.
The two situations have some features in common. In each, the scientist sharing has
something to lose by increasing the odds that another scientist will win the prize; hence in
both an increase in the value of the prize is likely to decrease sharing. Also the potential
for feedback in general sharing and the potential to obtain materials in the future in speciﬁc
sharing play similar roles. Nonetheless, the two contexts of sharing are fundamentally dif-
ferent. In general sharing, credit for work is an important issue and in speciﬁc sharing the
expected duration of play is important.
Our unique survey data allow us to explore these diﬀerences empirically. Our empirical
analysis uses as the dependent variable responses to six questions in the survey on willingness
to share. Three of the questions relate to general sharing and three to speciﬁc sharing.
Separate empirical models are estimated for each of the sets of questions. The independent
variables capture information about life cycle or career stage attributes, the scientiﬁct e a m ,
the research proﬁle, entrepreneurship, and attitudes about the external research environment
(to include ideas about the role of the norms of science), as well as some demographic
eﬀects. The econometric analysis shows clearly that the determinants of general and speciﬁc
sharing are very diﬀerent. Among the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, only a measure
of competition in respondents’ ﬁeld is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent in the two models. In other
respects they diﬀer markedly. For example, we ﬁnd that large teams are more likely to share
speciﬁcally but less likely to share generally. Academic rank does not matter for general
sharing, but it does for speciﬁc sharing, where untenured faculty are less likely to share
2generally.
The insights from our games contribute to the theoretical literature on information ex-
change and disclosure of research results, which with few exceptions has focused on exchanges
among ﬁrms (Anton and Yao 2002, 2004; Scott and Mezzetti 2005; Lerner and Tirole 2002;
Gill 2008; Hellmann and Perotti 2007; Stein 2008). Although they focus on a diﬀerent con-
text, Hellmann and Perotti (2007) and Stein (2008) are similar in relating sharing of ideas
to complementarity among the players, but their players are not competing for a priority-
based prize and they assume an extreme form of complementarity. In their work, further
production of ideas or inventions by researchers requires the skills or ideas of complemen-
tors. In our model of general sharing, complementors have solved complementary parts of
the problem, but all scientists have a positive probability of solving the complete problem.
Sharing results with complementors has the upside of feedback but it also has the negative
eﬀect of increasing their chance of winning.
There is an emerging theoretical literature on information exchange in academia which
focuses on an economic analysis of publication. Arijit Mukherjee and Scott Stern (2009)
examine the trade-oﬀ between disclosure through publication and secrecy, and show that
the feasibility of open science as an equilibrium depends on the costs of future researchers
accessing information and the relative beneﬁts of secrecy. Closer to the spirit of our research,
several papers have examined the impact of academic misconduct on research and publication
decisions (Hoover 2006; Lacetera and Zirulia 2008). Our work diﬀe r si ni t sf o c u so ns h a r i n g
during the research process. Although we do not endogenize veriﬁcation in our general
sharing model, our approach borrows heavily from the intuition of Lacetera and Zirulia
(2008).
Our empirical results contribute to an emerging literature on the ways in which academics
disclose their work (Murray 2009). While information-sharing among academic scientists per
se has not received much attention in the empirical literature, signiﬁcant withholding has
been documented (e.g., Blumenthal et al. 1996; Campbell et al. 2002). The main factors
that have been identiﬁed as inﬂuencing sharing include the cost, involvement in business
activities, protecting the ability of students to publish, and scientiﬁc competition (Campbell
et al. 2002; Walsh and Hong 2003; Walsh et al. 2007). For both industry and academic
scientists Carolin Haeussler (2009) has found expected reciprocity and the extent to which
scientists perceive that their community adheres to the scientiﬁc norm of communalism to be
important. These studies concentrate on sharing in the speciﬁc context, where scientists have
received requests for materials. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of speciﬁc sharing to
highlight the role of career stage. In addition, we consider both this case of speciﬁcs h a r i n g
and the more proactive one of general sharing of research progress in order to gain visibility
3and receive feedback. By considering both speciﬁc and general sharing we have been able
to highlight important diﬀerences in the context. This allows us to provide an analysis of
the factors that inﬂuence general sharing in the presence of potential misappropriation of
results- something which is consider a major problem in science (Bailey, Euzent, Martin, and
List 2001; Enders and Hoover 2004; Birnholtz 2006; Couzin-Frankel and Grom 2009).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the speciﬁc and general
sharing games are developed. These games are then empirically tested in section 3. Section
4 concludes with a discussion of the ﬁndings.
2 Games of Information Sharing
In both games, we consider scientists working to solve a common research problem, which if
completely solved earns a prize, W. The prize, such as publication, a Fields Medal or Nobel
Prize could have academic value, or it could have commercial value, such as a patent, or it
could have both. We further suppose that each of the scientists has solved a portion of the
problem and/or developed materials of use in solving the problem.
2.1 SpeciﬁcS h a r i n g
We ﬁrst consider sharing in one-on-one situations in which one scientist is asked by another
to share speciﬁc materials or data. In this game, we abstract from issues related to possible
misappropriation and focus only on the eﬀect of sharing on the probability of winning and
the role of reciprocity in the decision to share.1 For simplicity, we also abstract from the
scientists’ decisions about asking for information and focus only on their choice as to whether
to share materials. In part, this is because our data on sharing in one-on-one situations
describe only the sharing decision, but also, as shown in Appendix 1, the results of the game
described below are not changed by considering the asking decision.
2.1.1 The Stage Game
Figure 1 presents a single stage of a game between two scientists. The scientists move
sequentially, with each deciding to share or not when it is her/his turn to move. Scientist 1’s
expected payoﬀ is given on the top line of each bracket or cell and scientist 2’s is given by
the bottom line. Scientist i has research materials or intermediate results represented by ri
≥ 0 (i =1 ,2). The ability of scientist j to exploit materials shared by i is represented by ej
1Since the scientist knows who requests the materials, misappropriation is less likely to be an issue than
in the general sharing game.
4≥ 0, so that the value to scientist j of materials shared by i is given by ejri ≥ 0. Admitting
the possibility that the two scientist’s diﬀer in their ability to exploit shared information will
allow us to derive comparative static results of interest for scientists in diﬀerent labs. For
simplicity we delete the value of a scientist’s own research results from her payoﬀs because
it does not aﬀect the relative returns to each strategy. The game is "winner take all" so that
each scientist gets W with probability less than one.
We model the probabilities of winning such that unilateral sharing by a scientist lowers
her/his probability of winning the prize. Suppose in the absence of sharing, z ∈ (0,1) is
the probability that scientist 1 wins the prize and 1 − z is the probability that scientist 2
wins; then if scientist 1 shares but 2 does not, the ﬁrst scientist’s probability of winning is
reduced to q<z , and the other scientist’s probability of winning increases to 1 − q>z .
Thus, we assume that it is the probability of winning relative to each other that matters.
Thus z is the probability of scientist 1 winning when they both share the information and
when neither shares; and q represents the probability of winning for a scientist who shares
when the other scientist does not.
Under these assumptions, there is a gain to both scientists from not sharing. That is,
the gain to the scientist 1 from not sharing is
G1(NS)=
(
(1 − z − q)W if scientist 2 shares,
(z − q)W if scientist 2 does not share.
(1)
Similarly, if scientist 2 decides not to share, he gains
G2(NS)=
(
(z − q)W if scientist 1 shares,
(1 − z − q)W if scientist 1 does not share.
(2)
Thus not sharing is a dominant strategy for each scientist and the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is that neither scientist shares her/his materials.2 Even though misappro-
priation of results is not a risk, sharing is not an equilibrium outcome for the stage game.
Nonetheless, sharing by both scientists Pareto dominates the Nash since zW + e1r2 >z W
and (1 − z)W + e2r1 > (1 − z)W. This game of speciﬁc sharing is thus a classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
2.1.2 The Probablistic Horizon Repeated Game
Except in extreme cases (such as immediately before retirement), however, the opportunities
to interact with colleagues and share information are not single events. A scientist who denies
2Notice this would be the unique Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous move game of speciﬁc sharing.
5a request for materials today may ﬁnd herself desiring materials from the other scientist in
the future. Thus it is more natural to consider scientists’ decisions in the context of a series
of repeated stage games. There are, of course, many variants of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games in which cooperative strategies (those with payoﬀs that Pareto dominate those of the
stage game Nash strategies) can be supported as subgame perfect equilibria, but one that
lends itself to our analysis is one with a probabilistic horizon game such as that of Arribas
and Urbano (2005). In such a game, the stage game is played repeatedly an unknown,
but ﬁnite number of times, and the scientists have a common probability distribution over
the length of the repeated game. This structure will allow us to consider how the stage
of scientists’ careers aﬀects their decisions to share. For example, the expected horizon for
untenured faculty is likely to be diﬀerent than midcareer scientists with tenure.
Thus we consider a game of unknown, but ﬁnite, length T, in which the scientists assign
a probability pt ≥ 0 t ot h eg a m ee n d i n gi np e r i o dt. We consider trigger strategies, in which
each scientist shares as long as the other has shared but once the other scientist refuses to
share, she refuses to share in subsequent periods. In deciding whether to share in period t,
scientist i weighs her gain against her expected loss if the game continues and scientist j
does not share in future periods. In order for sharing to be an equilibrium, the expected loss
to each scientist from punishment (the inability to gain access to the other’s materials in the
future) must outweigh the maximum gain from not sharing in period t. Intuitively, this is
more likely to occur the longer the expected length of the game. Put somewhat diﬀerently,
the lower the probability the game will continue, the less weight the scientists place on their
loss from not obtaining materials in the future.







≤ E[T | T ≥ t] − t (3)
where ϕi(NS)=m a x i Gi(NS) and πi(NS)=eirj. An equilibrium involving sharing exists
when the scientists expect the game to last long enough. Further, the gain from not sharing
in period t relative to the loss incurred from the punishment in any future period determines
the minimum number of additional periods the scientists must expect for such cooperation.
Arribas and Urbano (2005) characterize the expected time of play (the right hand side of
condition 3) in terms of a parameter α which represents the extent to which players expect
the stage game to continue beyond the current period.3 They show that when α =0 ,t h e
expected length of the game converges to 0 (i.e., limt→∞ E[T | T ≥ t] − t =0 ) .T h a t i s ,
when the players’ conﬁdence in repetition of the game decreases rapidly, they expect the
3Mathematically, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is deﬁned as liml→∞
ptl+1
ptl
where {ptl} is a subsequence of {pt}.
6game to end soon, in which case the condition in (3) cannot hold. In contrast, when α =1 ,
limt→∞ E[T | T ≥ t] − t = ∞, and the players expect inﬁnite repetition of the game. The
condition in (3) holds so that the players cooperate. Finally, when α ∈ (0,1), Arribas and
Urbano show that limt→∞ E[T | T ≥ t]−t = α
1−α, in which case cooperation for a number of
























Proposition 1 Consider the probabilistic horizon game described above in which condition
(4) characterizes the existence of sharing for some length of time as a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Then
(i) The likelihood of sharing in equilibrium increases with a decrease in W or an increase in
α, q, ei,r j for i 6= j.
(ii) The likelihood of scientist i sharing in equilibrium increases with z if z ≤ 0.5 and de-
creases with z if z>0.5.
Proof. Clearly (4) is more likely to hold the higher is α. Given α, the condition in (4)
is more likely to hold the lower is α. It is straightforward to show that ∂α/∂W > 0 and
∂α/∂x < 0 for x = q, ei ,r j for i 6= j which proves (i). Similarly, ∂α/∂z < 0 if z ≤ 0.5 and
∂α/∂z > 0 if z>0.5.
With an increase in α the expected length of the game increases so that the weight the
scientists attach to future punishment increases. That is the expected number of periods
in which they can be punished increases. To understand the result for q,r e c a l lt h a ti t
represents the probability of winning for a scientist who shares when the other does not.
Thus, unambiguously, as q increases, the single period gains to each scientist from not
sharing fall.
Recall that z is the probability that scientist 1 wins when 1 and 2 t a k et h es a m ea c t i o n
and (1−z) is the probability that scientist 2 wins when they take the same action. Thus, all
else equal, the likelihood of sharing is greatest when the scientists are equally matched (i.e.,
z =0 .5).A sz deviates from 0.5, the scientists are less equally matched in the competition.






1−α. The reader is referred to Arribas and Urbano
(2005) for those conditions.
7The scientist with the advantage is increasingly less willing to share as her probability of
winning increases, while the scientist with a disadvantage is more likely to share as her
probability of winning increases. Thus when z>0.5, scientist 1 has the advantage so that
an increase in z decreases the likelihood she will share because her gain from not sharing
increases (i.e., ϕ1(NS)=m a x G1(NS)=( z − q)W. When z<0.5, scientist 1 has the
disadvantage so that an increase in z increases the likelihood she will share because her gain
from not sharing decreases (i.e., ϕ1(NS)=m a xG1(NS)=( 1− z − q)W.
2.2 General Sharing
In this section, we consider sharing in a diﬀerent context: conference or workshop presenta-
tion of intermediate results from ongoing research. Again scientists face conﬂicting incentives.
Presentation of preliminary results allows the scientist to gain feedback, but if the presen-
tation provides useful insights for others it may increase the probability that someone else
beats her to completely solving the problem. Presentation also has the beneﬁt of announcing
her progress which will aﬀord credit for that work, but only if others acknowledge it. To
examine this situation, we present a simple sequential move game in which misappropriation
is possible. Our interest is in the conditions under which preliminary work is presented and
appropriately acknowledged as an equilibrium outcome.
While this game has some elements in common with the speciﬁc sharing game (and in
the special case of two competing scientists, has a similar outcome to the single stage speciﬁc
sharing game), we emphasize that the context is quite diﬀerent. In general sharing, we focus
on the decision of a scientist to share results in order to obtain recognition rather than the
decision of scientists to share information when asked.
We assume there are M ≥ 2 scientists trying to solve the same research problem and
as before W is the prize for the solution. To distinguish this situation from one in which
a scientist considers sharing research materials, we represent the portion of the problem
Scientist 1 has solved as σ ∈ (0,1). The M − 1 other scientists are trying to solve the same
problem, but none has completely solved it; if any scientist has totally solved it, the game
ends.
We consider the decision of a single scientist, scientist 1, who is deciding whether to
present her results to the entire community in an eﬀort to get credit σW for her progress.
We let γ ∈ (0,1) be the probability that a randomly chosen scientist has solved a diﬀerent
part of the problem, and call that scientist a complementor. Then λ =1− (1 − γ)M−1
is the probability that at least one of the M − 1 scientists is a complementor. Presenting
to a complementor has two eﬀects. It allows for feedback from the complementors, which
8we represent as adding τ to W, but it also reduces her probability of winning. We denote
scientist 1’s probability of winning as x ∈ (0,1) if she does not present or presents and there
are no complementers and (x−δ) ∈ (0,1) if she presents to at least one complementor If she
presents to an audience without any complementors, she gets neither feedback that increases
her potential prize nor reduces her probability of winning.
The game is represented in extensive form by Figure 2. In stage zero Nature chooses γ,
and in stage one, scientist 1 chooses between sharing her results (P) with the community or
not (NP). If she presents, she makes the M−1 scientists aware of her progress (e.g., they can
attend her presentation or access her working paper). Scientists obtain information from 1,
and all (including scientist 1) continue working on the problem. In stage two, nature decides
which scientist ﬁrst solves the problem. If the winner is not scientist 1, he decides whether
to acknowledge 1’s work (A)o rn o ta c k n o w l e d g ei t( NA).5 If the winner acknowledge 1’s
work, he earns only partial credit, (1 − σ)W. If the winner does not acknowledge 1’s work,
he earns the full credit of W. But with probability v one of M −2 scientists, observing both
the winner’s work and scientist 1’s, will verify that the winner has used 1’s idea without
acknowledging it. In this case, the winner suﬀers a loss of reputation R and earns no credit.
We denote scientist 1’s belief that a randomly chosen scientist will provide veriﬁcation as ρ ∈
(0,1) and assume that the M scientists share this belief. Then we can write each scientist’s
belief that at least one of the M − 2 (other than 1 and the winner) as v =1− (1 − ρ)M−2
Consider the winner’s decision. Whether acknowledging scientist 1’s work is in his interest
depends on the probability that another scientist will verify the originality of the his work,
the reputational loss if misappropriation is veriﬁed, as well as the size of the prize and the






For acknowledgement to be worthwhile for the winner, he has to expect the likelihood of
veriﬁcation to be suﬃciently high. Recall that v is related to the number of scientists working
on the same problem (and by our assumption privy to the working paper or having come to









5Thus we have implicitly assumed that Scientist 1 cannot, herself, force those with whom she shares to
acknowledge her work. This seems appropriate for work that is neither published nor patented. Even for
results codiﬁed by publication or patent, one can argue that an external mechanism is involved.
9Thus, one of the implications of the model is that if only two scientists are working on
the problem, then the winner will never acknowledge scientist’s 1’s work. Thus the only
reason that scientist 1 would present is for feedback since credit for her progress will not be
forthcoming. Although we have not examined scientist 1’s decision yet, we will ﬁnd that
unless there is a third person who can verify, she will not present unless there is suﬃcient
feedback. If τ =0and M =2 , the unique equilibrium of this model is (NP,NA).
In making her decision, scientist 1 considers these two factors (veriﬁcation and feedback)
but also the impact of presenting on her likelihood of winning. The diﬀerence between her
expected utility from presenting and not presenting is
U
P − U
NP =( 1− x)σWC + λτ + λ(σC − 1)δW (7)
where C =P r ( A)+vPr(NA) is the probability that she will receive credit regardless of
whether or not the winner acknowledges,
Pr(A) ≡
(
1 if (6) holds
0 otherwise,
and Pr(NA)=1− Pr(A).T h eﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n do f(7) is the announcement
eﬀect and reﬂects the credit she hopes to get from presentation. The second is the positive
aspect of complementors in the audience and depends on their feedback. The last term is
the negative impact of complementors in the audience and depends on the extent to which
presentation improves their chances of winning. This ﬁts our intuition that for presenting
to dominate not presenting, the eﬀects of announcement and feedback need to outweigh the
negative impact from complementors among the M scientists.





Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 characterize the pure strategy equilibria and comparative
statics for this game.
Lemma 1 There are four potential pure strategy equilibria of the game
(P,A),(P,NA),(NP,A),and (NP,NA).L e tv = σW
R+W and C =
λ[δW−τ]
[(1−x)+λδ]σW
(i) (P,A) is an equilibrium for v>v and C>C.
(ii) (P,NA) is an equilibrium for v<v and C>C.
(iii) (NP,A) is an equilibrium for v>v and C<C.
(iv)(NP,NA) is an equilibrium for v<v and C< C.
10Proposition 2 (i) The likelihood that acknowledgement by the winner is an equilibrium
strategy is increasing in M, ρ, R and decreasing in σ. It is increasing in W if v>σ .
(ii) The likelihood that scientist 1 will present in equilibrium is increasing in τ,ρ,and R and
decreasing in W, x and δ.I ti si n c r e a s i n gi nM for τ>δ W .T h ee ﬀect of σ is ambiguous.
Proof. (i) follows from diﬀerentiating (v − v) with respect to the parameters and (ii)
follows from diﬀerentiating (C − C).
T h er e s u l t sf o rM and ρ in Proposition 2(i) are quite intuitive. The likelihood of veriﬁca-
tion increases with an increase in either the number of individuals working on the problem
or the belief that a random selected scientist will verify the role of the presenting scientist’s
work in the winner’s solution. Recall that R is the loss or penalty for misappropriation so
this result is intuitive as well. An increase in R decreases the right hand side of (5) thus
increasing the likelihood that the winner will acknowledge the presenting scientist’s contri-
bution. On the other hand an increase in σ, the portion of the problem that scientist 1 has
solved, increases the right hand of (5).
The results in (ii) highlight the conﬂicting eﬀects of presentation. An increase in feedback,
τ,increases the positive eﬀect from presenting to complementors, while increases in W, x or δ
increase the potential loss from presenting to them. An increase in the size of the audience,
M, increases the likelihood of at least one complementor in the audience which increases
both the positive eﬀect associated with feedback and the negative eﬀect from increasing
their chances of winning the prize, W. If τ>δ W , the feedback eﬀect dominates so that
presentation in equilibrium is more likely. Finally, increases in ρ, and R both increase the
probability that she will receive credit of σW, whether or not the winner, if not herself,
acknowledges her contribution.
3 Econometric Analysis
As noted earlier we exploit a unique survey of public sector bio-scientists’ willingness to share.
The scientists are employed in a university or a public research organization in either the
United Kingdom or Germany. Industry scientists are excluded since their willingness to share
is related to motives not found among public sector scientists (see, for example, Haeussler
2009). We exclude questionnaires from scientists who were older than 65 years. The ﬁnal
sample has 1173 observations that met our criteria (approximately 21% are employed in the
United Kingdom). Appendix 2 provides details of the survey.
Of greatest importance to the present study is a series of six questions regarding a sci-
entist’s willingness to share information. Table 1 provides lists the questions along with
11our shorthand notation for the questions. Willingness to share is measured on a ﬁve-point
Likert scale ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly. With the exception of the
ﬁrst question, agreement implies some degree of unwillingness to share. For purposes of
the analysis responses are coded so that higher scores imply a greater willingness to share
or fewer restrictions on sharing. Thus, for question one “agree strongly” which implies a
willingness to share, receives a value of 5 and “disagree strongly” receives a value of 1. The
opposite coding is used for the other questions so that, for example, disagree strongly, which
implies a strong willingness to share, is coded as a 5.
The six sharing questions fall into the two distinct types of sharing discussed above. One
group is composed of questions regarding speciﬁc sharing; these are questions 4, 5 and 6
in Table 1. Questions 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1 address general sharing. Arguably, question
2, Withhold, could refer to a speciﬁc sharing situation and question 5, ExpectFeed,c o u l d
refer to a situation of general sharing. Initially, we use the separations in Table 1; in our
robustness checks we account for alternative interpretations for questions 3 and 5.
Summary statistics are in Tables 2 and 3. The correlations in Table 3 are all positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at a 1% level with the exception of the correlation between
Delay and ExpectFeed which is not signiﬁcant at standard levels. It is noteworthy that the
largest simple correlation in Table 3 is less than 0.5 suggesting that the six questions address
distinct issues within and across diﬀerent types of sharing.
3.1 SpeciﬁcS h a r i n g
We use an ordered logit model to explain the responses provided for the three speciﬁcs h a r i n g
questions. Each respondent can provide up to three responses regarding speciﬁc sharing, and
our econometric approach is to “stack” responses to the three questions so that we consider
a single econometric model explaining Likert scores for the speciﬁc sharing questions as a
function of a set of independent variables. That is, we have created a panel where the
ﬁrst person in the sample provides the ﬁrst three observations (assuming that an answer is
provided for each sharing question). The second person provides observations 4 through 6,
etc. Since each respondent can appear in the data up to 3 times, we use cluster standard
errors to account for within individual correlations across the disturbances.
The independent variables capture information about life cycle or career stage attributes,
the scientiﬁc team, the research proﬁle, entrepreneurship, and attitudes about the external
research environment (to include ideas about the role of the norms of science), as well as
some demographic eﬀects. Most of the independent variables are included based on our
priors on the determinants of sharing. A set of them, however, are directly associated with
12variables and parameters of our theoretical model. We present these ﬁrst.
According to Proposition 1 sharing is less likely the larger the prize for solving the
problem. We do not directly observe the prize, but it is reasonable to expect competition
to be greater for prizes of higher value. In the survey, respondents are asked to rate on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale how tough is the competition in their ﬁeld. Competition takes on
the value respondents attach to the level of competition where higher values indicate greater
competition. In our theory, we did not distinguish between prizes of commercial value and
those that reinforce scientiﬁc reputation. Empirically both may be relevant. As a measure of
the importance of scientiﬁc recognition, we use the extent to which respondents believe the
reward structure of open science operates in their ﬁeld. Respondents were asked to rate, on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale, to what extent they agree that the ﬁr s tt oc o m eu pw i t hn e wr e s e a r c h
results is highly esteemed among peers. Higher values of FirstEsteemed indicate greater
esteem. As a measure of the commercial potential of the respondent’s research, we use the
number of technically unique patent applications (not double-counting congeneric patents at
distinct national patent oﬃces) that the respondent claims list them as an inventor. Thus
we would expect both FirstEsteemedand Patentsto have negative coeﬃcients.
The ability of scientist i to exploit information received from another researcher, ei,i s
also unobserved, but we argue that the size of the researcher’s team should be positively
correlated with the unobserved ei. As suggested by Guimera et al. (2005) larger teams
enable specialization and eﬀective division of labor and empirically Wuchty et al. (2007)
and Adams et al. (2005) ﬁnd that larger teams are more productive. TeamSize is the
number of scientists with an academic degree who are currently working in the respondent’s
research group.
The longer the length of time the scientists expect the game to continue, α,t h eg r e a t e r
the likelihood of sharing. Given the structure of the survey this only can be captured for the
scientist of whom the request is made. An increase in age reduces the number of periods in
which scientists can be punished for non-sharing or rewarded for sharing. Studying sharing
in the context of a speciﬁc, identiﬁed request, Haeussler (2009) ﬁnds that older scientists
a r el e s sl i k et os h a r ei n f o r m a t i o n .W ei n c l u d et h ea g eo ft h es c i e n t i s t ,Age. We also include
Professor which is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is a professor (and
hence has tenure) and it is equal to zero if the rank is less than professor (and the respondent
does not in general have tenure). While untenured faculty generally have a longer life cycle
horizon, they also have a horizon deﬁned by the date they are considered for tenure. We
argue that the latter dominates in determining the expected length of any game involving
at least one untenured faculty member. An argument also can be made that the size of the
prize from research is higher for untenured faculty since the awarding of tenure is a part of
13the prize. If so, then a positive eﬀect of Professor might be due in part to a higher W for
untenured faculty.
The remaining regressors are included based on our priors as to the determinants of
sharing. We include the number of full time employees, Responsible, who currently report
directly to the respondent. In experimental settings Charness et al. (2007) and Fei Song
(2008) ﬁnd that cooperation is less likely in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games when indi-
viduals view themselves as representing members of a group. While their setting is one of
cooperation and ours is speciﬁc sharing, we nonetheless expect higher values of Responsible
to be associated with less sharing.
The greater respondent’s beliefs that the norms of science operate in their ﬁeld the
greater is the expected level of sharing. Respondents were asked to rate, on a ﬁve-point
Likert scale, to what extent they agree that open exchange of information is usually being
practiced among researchers. Higher values of OpenExchange indicate that more openness
is practiced. Haeussler (2009) reports for a sample of scientists in academia and in industry
that the likelihood of sharing information with an inquirer increases by the extent to which
scientists perceive that their community adheres to the scientiﬁc norm of communalism.
Respondents were also asked on a ﬁve-point Likert scale the extent to which they believe
that someone who exploits the ideas of others against their will is bound to lose reputation.
Higher values of ExploitLosereﬂect a stronger belief that punishment takes place and higher
values are expected to be positively associated with sharing.
Five regressors are used to capture the respondent research proﬁles and views on factors
that inﬂuence reputation. Publications is the total number of respondent publications as
reported by the respondent. Walsh et al. (2007) report that among academic bio-scientists
the number of publications is positively associated with the likelihood that a request for
information is denied. Respondents rated on a 5 point Likert scale the importance for
their reputation among peers of the number of articles published in peer reviewed journals,
PubReputation and the number of patents ﬁled PatentReputation.T h u s , n o t o n l y d o
we include the numbers of patents and publications but also their perceived importance
to respondent’s reputation. Respondents also were asked to rate, on a ﬁve-point Likert
scale, how strongly they pursue basic research. Higher values of Basic indicate a greater
concentration on basic research, and our prior is that higher values are associated with
greater sharing. Finally, OwnResearch is the percentage of the respondent’s time that is
spent on their own research. This is a measure of how engaged the respondent is in research
rather than other activities such as administration, teaching or grant writing; we do not have
a prior about the eﬀect of OwnResearch on sharing.
We include two regressors in addition to PatentReputation to capture what might be
14referred to as academic entrepreneurship. Consult is the percentage of the respondent’s
time that is spent “advising companies.” Using a measure for business activity (ranging
from being involved in writing a business plan to founding a ﬁrm), Cohen and Walsh (2008)
report that academic scientists involved in business activities show a lower willingness to
fulﬁll an information request than scientists never involved in any such activity. Finally,
FamilyEnt is an indicator variable equal to one if a parent or sibling of the respondent is
af o u n d e ro faﬁrm. Scientists with family members who are entrepreneurs may be more
cognizant of the potential commercial value of their discoveries and hence less likely to share.
In a recent study, Haeussler (2009) indeed ﬁnds that scientists with an entrepreneur in their
family are less likely to fulﬁll a request for information.
Other control variables include Married which is an indicator variable equal to one if the
respondent is married and Malewhich is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent
is male. Empirical evidence on the eﬀect of gender on information-sharing is mixed. Whereas
Campbell et al. (2002) ﬁnd that men are more likely to refuse requests for information,
Walsh et al. (2007) report women to more likely deny a request for information. Haeussler
(2009) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender on the willingness to share information. UK is an
indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is a scientist working in the United Kingdom,
otherwise they are working in Germany. Respondents were asked to indicate in which of 13
subﬁelds of biological sciences they worked. Multiple subﬁelds were permitted. They were
also provided with an “other” category. Indicator variables for subﬁe l da r ei n c l u d e di nt h e
regressions; however we do not provide the estimated coeﬃcients in our results.
Finally, we include an indicator variable NotPassif the question is question 4 in Table 1
and an indicator variable ExpectFeed if the question is question 5 in Table 1. ExpectFutInfo
is the omitted category.
Results for the speciﬁc sharing questions are Panel A of Table 4. The variables as-
sociated with the size of the prize, Competition, FirstEsteemed,a n dPatents have the
expected negative signs but only the ﬁrst of these is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
ability of a scientist to exploit information received from another researcher is measured by
TeamSize. Our theoretical model predicts a positive coeﬃcient for TeamSize; that is, larger
teams are associated with greater sharing. The coeﬃcient of TeamSizeis both positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The time horizon is captured by Age and Professor. Age is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero and, hence, does not provide support for Proposition 1.I no u rs a m p l et h ea v e r a g e
age of respondents is a fairly young 46 and only 15% of respondents are older than 55 and
6% are older than 60, thus the insigniﬁcance of Age may be due simply to not having a
l a r g es a m p l ec l o s et ot h ee n do ft h e i rc a r e e r .T h ei n s i g n i ﬁcance of the age variables may be
15a matter of too few observations on scientists close to the end of their career. Professor
has the predicted positive sign and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Recall, however, our
discussion that the eﬀect of Professor could be negatively associated with the size of the
prize; if so, that is another reason for a positive eﬀect.
The coeﬃcient of Responsible has the anticipated negative sign, but it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. OpenExchange, the extent to which the respondent believes the norm of
open exchange is practiced, has the expected positive sign and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The likelihood of scientists’ speciﬁc sharing increases when the community is perceived
to follow the norm of communalism. ExploitLose has an unexpected negative sign but it
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The patent reputation variable, PatentReputation,
is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Recall that the coeﬃcient of number of
p a t e n t si sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero; if the reputation variable is excluded, then
Patentsis negative and signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero as expected from the theory.
The number of publications and the publication reputation variable are neither individu-
ally nor jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Basic is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, as expected. With the exception of the two question indicator variables NotPass
and ExpectFeed, the other coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Earlier we noted that the question Withhold could arguably be included as a speciﬁc
sharing question. We included this question as speciﬁc sharing and the results are given in
Panel B of Table 4. Results are nearly identical to the base model. The only exceptions
a r et h a tb o t hPatents and Responsible are now signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and both
have the expected negative signs. We further noted that ExpectFeed could arguably be a
general sharing rather than a speciﬁc sharing question. Results when only NotPass and
ExpectFutInfo are treated as speciﬁc sharing questions are in Panel C. Compared to the
base model the coeﬃcients of Responsible and Patents are signiﬁcant as they are in Panel
B.
The literature on the eﬀects of team size on the productivity of the team has generally
found positive eﬀects of increasing the size of teams when the team is small. Some have found
am o d e r a t i n ge ﬀect as teams get larger (Emilio Diaz-Frances, S. Ruiz-Velasco, and Jaime
Jimenez 1995) while others have found the eﬀect to remain linear (J.E. Cohen 1981; Hildrun
Kretschmer 1985). We included the square of the size of the team, TeamSq, and results
are in the ﬁnal panel of Table 4. TeamSize and TeamSq are not individually signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, but they are jointly diﬀerent from zero (p-value = 0.0532). Results are
very similar to the base case.
Finally, we consider the base model but a separate regression is estimated for each ques-
tion. For brevity, detailed results are not presented. The results are quite similar to the
16results in Table 4 with the exception that some of the estimated coeﬃcients are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero; this is not surprising since the individual regressions equations
are based on many fewer observations.
3.2 General Sharing
As in the speciﬁc sharing econometric model, we stack the three general sharing questions
(questions 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1) to form a panel and then use those responses as the
dependent variable in an ordered logit model with cluster standard errors. We include
independent variables that capture information about life cycle or career stage attributes,
the scientiﬁc team, the research proﬁle, entrepreneurship, and attitudes about the external
research environment, as well as some demographic eﬀects.
A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n2 the number of scientists, M, working on the problem increases
the likelihood of veriﬁcation which, all else equal, increases the likelihood of presentation.
An increase in M also increases the chance that at least one complementor is a part of the
audience. This has conﬂicting eﬀects. An increase in M will increase the chance a scientist
will present, if the positive eﬀect of feedback from complementors outweighs the potential
loss from her giving them her part of the solution. In our data we do not have measures that
would allow us to control for these latter eﬀects, so that, empirically, the eﬀect of an increase
in M is ambiguous. We do not have a direct measure of M but it should be positively
correlated with the level of competition, Competition,i nt h eﬁeld. However, as noted above,
the level of competition is expected to be positively correlated with the size of the prize W.
According to Proposition 2( ii) the eﬀect of an increase in W decreases the likelihood that a
scientist will present her work. Consequently, the overall eﬀect of a change in Competition
is ambigious.
As in the speciﬁc sharing case, we use two measures of the prize, per se, FirstEsteemed
and Patents. According to Proposition 2( ii) the eﬀects of FirstEsteemed and Patents
should be negative.
The probability that a given scientist will verify is ρ and our measure is the respondent’s
belief that the norms of science are operative in their ﬁeld. Previous research suggests that
the strength of a norm is associated with the anticipated consequence of violating the norm
(e.g., Bendor and Swistak 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 2001). Higher values of OpenExchange
indicate more openness and veriﬁcation is practiced so that higher values should be associated
with more sharing.
R is the loss or penalty for misappropriation and higher values lead to greater sharing.
In the survey respondents were asked on a ﬁve-point Likert scale the extent to which they
17believe that someone who exploits the ideas of others against their will is bound to lose
reputation. Higher values of ExploitLose reﬂect a stronger belief that punishment takes
place.
The other controls included in the model are the demographic variables UK, Age,
Professor, Married and Male.T e a m e ﬀects, TeamSize and Responsible,a r ea l s oi n -
cluded. Three regressors are used to capture the respondent’s research proﬁle (Publications,
PubReputation, Basic and OwnResearch) and three regressors are included to measure
academic entrepreneurship (Consult, FamilyEnt, PatentReputation,a n dPatents). The
research proﬁle measures are expected to be positively associated with sharing and the mea-
sures of academic entrepreneurship are expected to be negatively associated with sharing.
Finally, we include indicator variable Withhold and Delay if the questions are 2 and 3
in Table 1, respectively. PresentUnpub is the omitted category.
Results for the general sharing questions are in the ﬁrst output columns in Table 5.
The coeﬃcient of Competition is negative and signiﬁcant. This is consistent either with
the eﬀect of W, the size of the prize, outweighing a positive eﬀect of M when feedback
eﬀe c t sd o m i n a t eo rw i t ht h ef e e d b a c ke ﬀect in M being dominated by the potential loss
from presenting to complementors. FirstEsteemed has a positive coeﬃcient, but it is not
statistically signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. OpenExchange has the anticipated positive
coeﬃcient and it is signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. ExploitLose has a counterintuitive
negative sign but it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
As was the case with the speciﬁc questions, those who conduct more basic research are
more willing to generally share. Responsible has the expected negative coeﬃcient which
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. PatentReputation, Patents, Consult and FamilyEnt
have the expected negative signs and with the exception of FamilyEntall are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The time horizon is captured by Age and Professor; neither are sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Men share less than women and UK scientists share less than
German scientists. Publications, PubReputation and OwnResearch are positive but not
signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Question 3 in Table 1, Delay, is quite diﬀerent from the other general sharing questions
in that it refers to a delay in sharing for the purpose of securing patent protection. We
dropped the Delay responses and re-estimated the model. Results are in Panel B of Table
5. Results are very similar to the base model except that the coeﬃcients of Publications
and PubReputation are now positive and signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and Consult and
UK are no longer signiﬁcant.
Earlier we noted that the question ExpectFeed could arguably be included as a general
sharing question. We included the question as a general sharing question and results are in
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that TeamSize is not longer signﬁcant. We further noted that WithHold could arguably
be a speciﬁc sharing question. Results when only PresentUnpub and Delay are included
as general questions are in Panel D. Results are very similar to those of the base model.
Finally, in Panel E we have added TeamSq to the base model. TeamSizeand TeamSq are
jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p-value = 0.0); otherwise the results are very similar
to the base model except that TeamSizeis not longer signﬁcant.
Finally, we consider the base model but a separate regression is estimated for each ques-
tion. For brevity, detailed results are not presented. The results are quite similar to the
results in Table 5 with the exception that some of the estimated coeﬃcients are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero; this is not surprising since the individual regressions equations
are based on many fewer observations.
3.3 Are the Models Diﬀerent?
A comparison of the speciﬁc model results in Table 4 with the general model results in
Table 5 suggests that the two forms of sharing are empirically quite diﬀerent. In order to
test for diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients we merged the speciﬁc and general data in a single
regression model. All regressors from the base models are included along with each of those
regressors interacted with an indicator variable General equal to 1 if the observation is a
general sharing question, and it is 0 for speciﬁc questions. An ordered logit model with
cluster standard errors is used. Tests of whether the interaction coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
(noted in the following as “G_” followed by a variable name) will reveal any statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two forms of sharing.6 For the sake of parsimony the
detailed results are not presented since the combined model does not provide any additional
evidence beyond that found in Tables 4 and 5; it only provides a convenient and appropriate
mechanism for testing diﬀerences across the models.
Before discussing the statistical tests, we use this combined model to ask whether re-
spondents are more likely to share generally than speciﬁcally. The estimated model is used
to predict the probabilities of each of the ﬁve levels of agreement separately for the case of
General = 1 and for the case of General = 0. The average probabilities are found in Figure
3. In that ﬁgure, for example, we see that based on the characteristics of a randomly chosen
individual the probability that the person will respond with the highest level of sharing is
0.26 if the question is a general sharing one. However, if the question is a speciﬁcs h a r i n g
6Simple tests of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients in Tables 4 and 5 would not account for the
non-independence of the two panels. Non-independence with the merged data is handled using the cluster
standard errors.
19question then the corresponding probability is only 0.12. Overall, respondents are much
more likely to engage in general sharing.
We conﬁne attention only to regressors that are signiﬁcant in either the speciﬁce base
model and/or the general base model. For this set of variables the only regressor with a
coeﬃc i e n tt h a ti sn o ts i g n ﬁcantly diﬀerent across the two types of sharing is Competition.
The coeﬃcient of TeamSizein this combined regression is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero while the coeﬃcient of TeamSizeinteracted with General (that is, G_TeamSize)
is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moveover, the sum of the two coeﬃcients is
negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero implying that the eﬀect of TeamSizeis greater
i nt h ec a s eo fGeneral sharing. Responsible is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the
case of speciﬁc sharing, but the coeﬃcient of G_Responsible is negative and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Thus the number of individuals directly reporting to the respondent
has no eﬀect on speciﬁc sharing, but it does have a negative eﬀect on general sharing as we
found in Panels A of Tables 4 and 5. The coeﬃcient of Professor and G_Professor are
both signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, the coeﬃcients are nearly identical though
opposite in sign and their sum is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus professors are
more willing than other faculty to engage in speciﬁc sharing, but there is no eﬀect on general
sharing; this is the result found in Tables 4 and 5.
Based on the results for OpenExchange,o u rm e a s u r ef o rρ in the general sharing model,
and the results for G_OpenExchange we can conclude that the more respondents believe
that the norms of science operate in their ﬁeld the more willing they are to speciﬁcally share,
and their willingness to share is even greater for general sharing. The coeﬃcients of Basicand
G_Basic are both positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The more a respondent is
engaged in basic research the more willing she is to speciﬁcally share, and the eﬀect is stronger
for general sharing. The coeﬃcients of PatentReputation and G_PatentReputation are
both negatively and signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r o .T h em o r ear e s p o n d e n tb e l e i v e st h a t
patents enhance their reputation the less willing she is to speciﬁcally share, and the eﬀect
is stronger for general sharing. The results in Tables 4 and 5 on Consult, Male and UK
continue to hold in the combined model. The only result from the combined model that is
not implied in the base models is that FamilyEnt has a negative and signﬁcant eﬀect on
general sharing.
What is most striking about the comparison is that Competition is the only regressor
that is signiﬁcant in one or both models and which statistically has the same eﬀect on both
types of sharing.
204C o n c l u s i o n
Information-sharing provides the basis for cumulative knowledge production and thus for
scientiﬁc progress. While sharing of information is desirable from a communal point of view,
scientists endogenously choose whether they share or not, with their decision depending on
competitive incentives in the research process.
Our game-theoretic models of sharing capture some of the main characteristics of the
scientiﬁc research process and the scientiﬁc community. The model for speciﬁcs h a r i n g
suggests that the likelihood of complying with a request for information is negatively related
to the size of the prize for solving a research problem and positively related to the value
of the inquirer’s results to date, the ability to exploit shared materials from the inquirer
and the probability of the game continuing. Furthermore, all else equal, scientists with
similar probabilities of winning the prize are more likely to share. For general sharing,
our model indicates that the likelihood of presenting intermediate research results to the
scientiﬁc community is increasing with the beneﬁts from announcing preliminary results in
terms of credit and feedback but decreasing with the danger that presenting might increase
the chance that other scientists will solve the entire research puzzle and win the prize. In
addition, general sharing depends on how likely it is that a contribution will be acknowledged
and, if not, that others will verify.
In general, our empirical results support both models, and in particular they support our
contention that understanding what drives scientists to share information depends on the
context. Among the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, only a measure of competition is
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent between the speciﬁc and the general sharing model. The empirical
diﬀerences are, in general, predicted by the theoretical models. For example, rank does not
matter for general sharing, but it does for speciﬁc sharing, where untenured faculty are less
likely to share. For speciﬁc sharing, large teams are more likely to share but less likely
to share generally. In addition, the empirical results imply that the stronger beliefs that
the norms of science operate, the more willing scientists are to speciﬁcally share, and their
willingness to share is even greater for general sharing.
Several limitations of the analysis suggest useful directions for future empirical research
in this area. First, regarding the empirical analysis, we along with others have examined
sharing among bio-scientists. Caution should always be exerted when generalizing from a
study in a speciﬁc context. While the bio-scientiﬁc ﬁeld is a prominent example of a highly
collaborative and competitive ﬁeld, we believe that the microeconomic conditions underlying
sharing decisions operate in other scientiﬁc ﬁelds as well. Second, these results are based on
survey data so that we cannot exclude the possibility that "common method bias" is an issue
21in this study. However, we completed a large number of pre-tests and validation tests and
are therefore conﬁdent in our data. Third, given the structure of our survey, we only capture
the characteristics of the scientist to whom the request was made. An analysis based on a
speciﬁc, identiﬁed request, would allow us to empirically examine the predictions regarding
asymmetries between the scientists in our speciﬁc sharing model. Fourth, our game-theoretic
model for general sharing suggests that a higher loss or penalty for non-acknowledgement
increases sharing. Our survey includes only a rough measure for punishment. More ﬁne-
grained measures for disciplinary mechanisms in place may provide more detailed insights
into their ubiquity and economic importance.
We also suggest future theoretical directions. To derive testable hypotheses we made a
number of theoretical simpliﬁcations. For example, for the general sharing model we assumed
that the scientist’s decision was whether to present to the entire community. This would be
the case for generally circulated working papers or presentations for conferences where papers
are posted on the internet. In some contexts, however, scientists may consider presenting to
a limited or a targeted audience, e.g., in an internal seminar series, or may even depend on
the type of audience or the stage of their research, e.g., presenting early research ideas in
an internal seminar and more developed research to a broader audience. Thus future work
may usefully consider endogenizing the number of scientists in the audience and the type of
shared material.
Further, while we point to ways in which information sharing depends on the microeco-
nomic conditions in which the research process is embedded, we abstract from the ways in
which the process is inﬂuenced by public policy. Consider, for example, our ﬁnding that
increased competition decreases the willingness to share in both speciﬁc and general sharing.
Competition is clearly a function of the number of scientists competing which we considered
to be exogenous. One policy that aﬀects competition is research funding. While one would
expect increased funding for research on a class of problems (such as the US National Nan-
otechnology Initiative) to soften competition for a given number of scientists, it is also likely
to attract more scientists to the area, which would increase competition.
Finally, there is a widely held belief that sharing information is always socially beneﬁcial.
We have not provided results on the impact of sharing on the aggregate rate of innovation
in the community. In both of our models, while we take into account the fact that the
sharer increases the chances of other scientists winning the prize, it does not aﬀect the
aggregate probability that the problem is solved. Such considerations are more complex, but
nonetheless worth pursuit.
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Type of  
Sharing 
1  I present unpublished or yet to be patented research 
results at conferences.  
PresentUnpub 
General 
2  When I discuss unpublished or yet to be patented 
research results, I often withhold crucial parts 
Withhold 
General 
3  In the past I have delayed or had to delay publica-
tion of my research in order to secure patenting the 
research results.  
Delay 
General 
4  I only discuss unpublished or yet to be patented 
research results with people who will for sure not 




5  I only discuss unpublished or yet to be patented 
research results with people from whom I expect 




6  Before I share unpublished or yet to be patented 
research results, I first consider whether or not I will 







Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable  No. Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables 
PresentUnpub  1160 3.559 1.181 1 5
Withhold  1149 3.080 1.170 1 5
Delay  1124 3.679 1.556 1 5
NotPass  1157 2.743 1.155 1 5
ExpectFeedback  1156 2.790 1.089 1 5
ExpectFutInfo  1131 3.308 1.105 1 5
Life cycle or stage of career 
Age  1176 45.964 7.715 29 65
Professor  1176 0.517 0.500 0 1
Scientific team 
Responsible  1159 10.004 23.779 0  572
TeamSize  1165 6.741 11.871 0  300
Research profile 
Publications  1158 70.707 67.484 0  550
PubReputation  1173 4.060 0.875 1 5
PatentReputation  1144 1.955 0.825 1 5
Basic  1175 3.962 1.132 1 5
OwnResearch  1172 0.186 0.175 0 1 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics (con’t) 
Academic entrepreneurship 
Patents  1131 2.841 9.324 0  131
Consult  1172 1.891 4.981 0  80
FamilyEnt  1158 0.242 0.428 0 1
External research environment 
Competition  1173 4.051 0.993 1 5
OpenExchange  1173 3.304 0.911 1 5
FirstEsteemed  1169 4.053 0.898 1 5
ExploitLose  1160 3.956 1.117 1 5
Married  1154 0.816 0.387 0 1
Male  1172 0.799 0.400 0 1
Other controls 
Married  1154 0.816 0.387 0 1
Male  1172 0.799 0.400 0 1
UK  1173 0.209 0.407 0 1
Bioprocess engineering  1176 0.025 0.155 0 1
Biochemistry  1176 0.268 0.443 0 1
Subfield controls 
Bioprocess engineering  1176 0.025 0.155 0 1
Cell biology  1176 0.317 0.465 0 1
Clinical medicine  1176 0.163 0.370 0 1
Developmental biology  1176 0.050 0.218 0 1
Genetics/Proteomics  1176 0.152 0.359 0 1
Immunology  1176 0.145 0.352 0 1
Microbiology  1176 0.146 0.353 0 1
Neuroscience  1176 0.190 0.392 0 1
Oncology  1176 0.112 0.316 0 1
Pharmaceutical sciences  1176 0.069 0.253 0 1
Plant sciences  1176 0.069 0.253 0 1
Other  1176 0.264 0.441 0 1
 
Table 3. Correlations Among  Sharing Question Responses* 
PresentUnpub Withhold Delay  NotPass  ExpectFeedback 
Withhold  0.400 
Delay  0.388 0.366 
NotPass  0.430 0.441  0.211 
ExpectFeedback  0.094 0.239  0.039  0.475 
ExpectFutInfo  0.246 0.462  0.202  0.406  0.414 
 
* All are significantly different from zero at the 1% level with the exception of the correlation between 
Delay and ExpectFeedback. 








Competition 0.8874 ‐2.44 ** 0.8749 ‐2.84 *** 0.8870 ‐2.26 ** 0.8860 ‐2.46 **
FirstEsteemed 0.9250 ‐1.49 0.9420 ‐1.20 0.9577 ‐0.78 0.9238 ‐1.51
Patents 0.9929 ‐1.39 0.9910 ‐1.82 * 0.9884 ‐1.65 * 0.9924 ‐1.43
Teamsize 1.0060 2.68 *** 1.0046 2.25 ** 1.0069 2.06 ** 1.0105 1.27
TeamSq 1.0000 ‐0.69
Age 1.0008 0.10 0.9957 ‐0.59 0.9930 ‐0.83 1.0013 0.16
Professor 1.4216 3.25 *** 1.3575 3.03 *** 1.4449 3.17 *** 1.4147 3.19 ***
Responsible 0.9979 ‐1.62 0.9972 ‐2.16 ** 0.9963 ‐2.42 ** 0.9978 ‐1.80 *
OpenExchange 1.1995 3.05 *** 1.2491 4.05 *** 1.2311 3.27 *** 1.1980 3.03 ***
ExploitLose 0.9485 ‐1.25 0.9612 ‐1.00 0.9461 ‐1.23 0.9484 ‐1.25
PatentReputation 0.7794 ‐3.78 *** 0.7439 ‐4.88 *** 0.7276 ‐4.46 *** 0.7818 ‐3.70 ***
PubReputation 1.0348 0.65 1.0274 0.54 1.0378 0.67 1.0351 0.66
Publications 1.0005 0.55 1.0011 1.17 1.0010 1.06 1.0004 0.40
Basic 1.1003 1.87 * 1.1002 2.06 ** 1.1250 2.17 ** 1.1016 1.89 *
OwnResearch 0.9978 ‐0.70 0.9998 ‐0.06 0.9983 ‐0.52 0.9979 ‐0.69
Consult 0.9934 ‐0.87 0.9904 ‐1.29 0.9888 ‐1.46 0.9933 ‐0.89
FamilyEnt 1.0892 0.81 1.0584 0.58 1.0662 0.57 1.0851 0.77
Married 1.2175 1.52 1.1966 1.50 1.1852 1.22 1.2112 1.48
Male 0.9071 ‐0.82 0.8500 ‐1.47 0.8414 ‐1.35 0.9087 ‐0.80
UK 1.0842 0.66 0.9908 ‐0.08 0.9121 ‐0.73 1.0823 0.65
NotPass 0.3751 ‐13.97 *** 0.3796 ‐14.14 *** 0.3811 ‐13.99 *** 0.3750 ‐13.97 ***
ExpectFeed 0.4067 ‐13.54 *** 0.4100 ‐13.65 *** 0.4067 ‐13.55 ***
Withhold 0.6822 ‐6.08 ***
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
r‐Square 0.0408 0.0395 0.0502 0.0408
Obs. 2991 3990 1987 2991





TeamSq A. Base ModelTable 5. General Sharing Ordered Logit Results
Variable Coef. t‐Stat Coef. t‐Stat Coef. t‐Stat Coef. t‐Stat
Competition 0.8941 ‐2.37 ** 0.8606 ‐2.55 ** 0.8944 ‐2.75 *** 0.9096 ‐1.86 * 0.8930 ‐2.39 **
FirstEsteemed 1.0099 0.20 1.0554 0.95 0.9779 ‐0.53 1.0176 0.31 1.0090 0.18
Patents 0.9567 ‐2.17 ** 0.9679 ‐2.72 *** 0.9722 ‐3.52 *** 0.9302 ‐2.07 ** 0.9561 ‐2.10 **
Teamsize 0.9938 ‐1.86 * 0.9949 ‐1.48 0.9967 ‐1.14 0.9874 ‐2.31 ** 0.9969 ‐0.30
TeamSq 1.0000 ‐0.42
Age 0.9895 ‐1.48 0.9876 ‐1.51 0.9966 ‐0.56 0.9925 ‐0.93 0.9898 ‐1.42
Professor 0.9765 ‐0.25 1.0815 0.71 1.0503 0.60 0.8938 ‐1.04 0.9735 ‐0.29
Responsible 0.9943 ‐3.45 *** 0.9948 ‐2.98 *** 0.9962 ‐3.94 *** 0.9948 ‐2.94 *** 0.9942 ‐3.44 ***
OpenExchange 1.2717 4.73 *** 1.4491 6.10 *** 1.2367 4.71 *** 1.2224 3.54 *** 1.2703 4.69 ***
ExploitLose 0.9470 ‐1.32 0.9544 ‐0.97 0.9502 ‐1.45 0.9279 ‐1.63 0.9468 ‐1.32
PatentReputation 0.6124 ‐8.38 *** 0.6188 ‐7.09 *** 0.6706 ‐8.05 *** 0.5897 ‐7.99 *** 0.6134 ‐8.28 ***
PubReputation 1.0603 1.17 1.1040 1.70 * 1.0496 1.13 1.0866 1.52 1.0606 1.18
Publications 1.0013 1.31 1.0030 2.65 *** 1.0008 0.89 1.0010 0.89 1.0012 1.18
Basic 1.1692 3.50 *** 1.1457 2.65 *** 1.1408 3.44 *** 1.2063 3.75 *** 1.1697 3.51 ***
OwnResearch 1.0020 0.78 1.0014 0.47 1.0008 0.37 1.0002 0.07 1.0021 0.80
Consult 0.9798 ‐2.37 ** 0.9935 ‐0.71 0.9851 ‐2.17 ** 0.9793 ‐2.16 ** 0.9798 ‐2.36 **
FamilyEnt 0.8715 ‐1.42 0.9407 ‐0.54 0.9304 ‐0.88 0.8476 ‐1.54 0.8691 ‐1.45
Married 1.0356 0.34 1.0704 0.54 1.0686 0.72 0.9968 ‐0.03 1.0325 0.31
Male 0.7037 ‐3.48 *** 0.7436 ‐2.52 ** 0.7795 ‐2.78 *** 0.6986 ‐3.06 *** 0.7048 ‐3.46 ***
UK 0.7769 ‐2.42 ** 0.8838 ‐0.99 0.9128 ‐0.95 0.7828 ‐2.08 ** 0.7755 ‐2.44 **
Withhold 0.4990 ‐11.81 *** 0.4350 ‐11.68 *** 0.4885 ‐11.93 *** 0.4991 ‐11.79 ***
Delay 1.5258 4.77 *** 1.5080 4.56 *** 1.5209 5.03 *** 1.5262 4.77 ***
ExpectFeed 0.3186 ‐15.61 ***
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
r‐Square 0.0829 0.0740 0.0707 0.0906 0.0829









































































































In this game, we incorporate the decision of “asking for data” into the specific-
sharing game described in Section 2. We show that the unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (SPNE) that is trembling-hand perfect (THP) is (AS, AS, NS, NS), the one 
which involves asking and not sharing. Trembling-hand perfection rules out subgame 
imperfect equilibriums that are unstable (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, 1995: 
Appendix B, Definition 9.BB.1; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991: p. 351) and thus, we only 
focus on THP equilibriums.  
 
In this set-up, scientists 1 and 2 decide whether to ask each other for data and 
whether to share their data when asked. AS stands for “asking” while NAS for “not 
asking”; S stands for “sharing” while NS stands for “not sharing”. 
 
There are six SPNEs shown by the bold paths above: <2 AS, 1 NS, 1 AS, 2 NS>, 
<2 AS, 1 NS, 1 NAS, 2S>, <2 AS, 1 NS, 1 NAS, 2NS>, <2 NAS 1 AS, 2 NS>; <2 NAS, 
1 NAS, 2 S>, <2 NAS, 1 NAS, 2 NS>. It is easy to show that none of the SPNEs with 
NAS is a trembling-hand perfect (THP) equilibrium as defined by Mas-Collel, Whinston, 
and Green 1995, Appendix B to Chapter 9. To show this, we first prove that in subgames 
1.3 and 1.4, the SPNE with NAS are not THP, while those with AS are THP.  
 
We first show that in subgame 1.3 circled above <1 AS, 2 NS> is THP. Assume 
scientist 1 plays a mixed strategy (1 − ε, ε) for (AS, NAS), for 0 < ε < 1 where ε  stands 
for a small error or deviation from 1’s equilibrium strategy AS. Scientist 2's expected 
payoffs from playing S and NS are given by  
W z W z W z
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 For a small deviation ε, scientist 2 maximizes his expected payoff by choosing NS. 
 
Similarly, we assume scientist 2 plays a mixed strategy (1 − ε, ε) for (NS, S), for 0 
< ε < 1. Scientist 1's expected payoffs from playing AS and NAS are given by:  
zW zW zW
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For all positive values of ε, scientist 1 maximizes her expected payoff by placing 
a minimal weight on NAS. Hence <1 AS, 2 NS> is trembling-hand perfect because both 
scientists maximize their expected payoff by staying with this equilibrium even if there is 
a small chance of error. 
 
  By contrast, <1 NAS, 2 NS> is not THP. Assume scientist 1 plays a mixed 
strategy (1 − ε, ε) for (NAS, AS), for 0 < ε < 1. Scientist 2's expected payoffs from 
playing S and NS are the following, and NS is THP: 
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NAS, however, is not THP. Assume scientist 2 plays a mixed strategy (1 − ε, ε) for (NS, 
S), for 0 < ε < 1. Scientist 1's expected payoffs from playing AS and NAS are given by: 
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For all positive values of ε, scientist 1 maximizes her expected payoff by placing a 
minimal weight on NAS. Hence <1 NAS, 2 NS> is not trembling-hand perfect because 
scientist 2 maximizes his expected payoff by deviating from this equilibrium when there 
is a small chance of error. Similarly, we can show <1 NAS, 2 S> is not THP. 
 
  Similarly, we can show that SPNEs with NAS are not THP in subgame 1.2. As a 
result, the only SPNE that is THP is <2 AS, 1 NS, 1 AS, 2 NS>. Both scientists ask each 
other for information, but neither would share. 
 
 Appendix 2:  Survey Design 
 
    The bio-sciences provide an attractive testing ground for our propositions. Compared 
with many other scientific and technological fields, in the bio-sciences, research has 
developed dramatically in the last few decades. The building of collective knowledge is a 
key strategic task for the success of scientists (Powell et al. 2005). 
    We developed and administered a survey in 2007 to bio-scientists in Germany and the 
UK, the two leading countries in the bio-sciences in Europe. To identify bio-scientists we 
first sampled bio-scientists listed as authors in PubMed, the most prominent database of 
bio-scientific and medical abstract citations. From this we identified 9,074 German 
scientists and 8,189 British scientists who had published an article between 2002 and 
2005, using search categories related to the bio-scientific field. We then sampled all 
inventors who filed patents with bio-scientific IPC codes with the European Patent Office 
between 2002 and 2005. This yielded 8,265 German and 4,196 British inventors. All 
identified scientists were invited to participate in an online questionnaire. About 22% of 
the German and British invitations did not reach the scientists, mostly because of 
incorrect data in the public databases, and because the addresses of scientists who had left 
the country or retired had not been updated. Where scientists had changed employers, we 
asked the former employer for the current address which was provided in about 88% of 
the cases. 
    The search categories we used for identifying scientists in the two databases were very 
broad. We concluded from discussions with experts and a small telephone survey with 
non-respondents that about 30% of the scientific authors and about 25% of the inventors 
caught in our sample were not in fact involved in bio-scientific research. In PubMed, as 
well as in the European Patent Database (Epoline), there are no search categories or IPC 
classes that explicitly identify bio-scientific research. When designing the study, we 
therefore decided to use rather broad categories. In the invitation letter to scientists we 
pointed out that our target respondents are scientists involved in the bio-scientific field. A 
total of 2,169 scientists identified through PubMed and 2,452 identified through the 
European Patent Database filled out our questionnaire. This translates into a response rate 
of 16% of publishing scientists and 25% of inventors. Once we had corrected for the 
percentage of people who had received an invitation but were not involved in the bio-
sciences (30% for publishing scientists and 25% for inventors), we ended up with a 
response rate of 23% in the case of publishing scientists and 33% in that of inventors. 
 